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Abstract 
This paper is performed based on the relation between corporate governance on Iranian corporations' performance 2006-2012 
financial years. The aim of this study is to determine the relationship between the elements of firm sovereignty and the 
management of real profit in the realm of the study.  The methodology of the study is based on the drawing a conclusion and the 
gathering of descriptive data and also based on practical application aim. The descriptive method is from correlated type and multi 
variable regressions are used to analyze the data and to examine assumption. Considering the first basic assumption (among firm 
sovereignty (concentration of ownership) and second assumption (between firm sovereignty (independence of the board of 
directors) and handling real activities there is a relation. The obtained conclusions show that: based on the first assumption there 
is a negative and meaningful relation between independency of board of directors and management of real profit based on 
unusual expenses of production. However no meaningful relationship was observed between concentration of property and real 
earning management. Based on the second assumption: there is a negative and meaningful relationship between the 
independency of the board of directors and the real management of real profit based on arbitrary expenses, however when the 
previous models is based on management of real profit model and arbitrary expenses and is considered, no meaningful 
relationship was observed between concentration of the property and possession and real earning management. 
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2) Introduction: 
When corporate governance composition involved in weak principles, there will be an increasing contradiction between 
great and the small investors or corporate governance may be taken into as a strong tool to decrease agencies' expenses. 
So according to the agency definition, investors and shareholders' biggest problem is their endeavorto gain approaches 
and means that can assure the sufficiency of their financial information. 
The present paper is insearch of solving problems of real earnings management by managers through strengthening 
corporate governance elements. Research results feel lead into better and effective control on real earnings management 
and information quality promotion and consequently better decision-making provided that there would be a relation here 
and gaining applied results. Since real earnings management as a main form of earnings management is not paid much 
attention by both foreign and Iranian researchers, so there are important aspects of this matter relation with some other 
variables that left without answers. Here the main question is that how much corporate governance elements can 
influence manipulation of firms' real activities (real earnings management)? 
The present study is in search of and is about the trial of this matter that applying which one of corporate governance 
elements can limit real activities manipulation and how much can this main issue influence reduction of agencies 
expenses? This study tries to convey the relation of mentioned variables and to measure the relation extent. Like the other 
researches on real earnings management, this paper begins with recognizing commercial activities unusual levels using 
expecting models (the models that provide the expected figure for a variable or phenomenon) and considers deviation rate 
from expected rate as an agent for management manipulation two criteria were used in order to determine manipulation 
rate of real activities (earnings real management) including manufacturing unusual expenses and abnormal discretionary 
expenses. 
2) Literature review 
Jensen, M. C. (1986) concluded in his research when institutional ownership percentage is adequately the great, 
institutional owners' monitoring prevents managers' weak performance. 
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., &Vishny, R. W. (1988).Hermalin, B. E., &Weisbach, M. S. (1991). Demsetz, H., & Lehn, K. (1985). 
Examined effect of ownership structure on firm performance. Their research results show that there's a positive and 
important relation between ownership structure and firm performance. 
Fosberg, R. H. (1989).  Found that there is no significant relation between performance variables and non-bound 
members' presence; such variables selling, staffs' numbers, and shareholders' salary efficiency. 
Rosenstein, S., & Wyatt, J. G. (1990).Evaluated the effect of outside managers' ratio in the board of directors and 
shareholders' wealth this research indicated that there is a direct relation between increasing board of directors outside 
managers' ratio and fears value. They attribute this value increase to monitoring on the firm management by outside 
managers of board of directors and consequently to firm performance improvement. 
Jensen, M. C. (1993).Declared that since board ownership percentage increase is in line with managers' and 
shareholders' profit, so it will lead to firm performance increase via decreasing agency's expenses. 
Ramsay, I. M., & Blair, M. (1993). Showed that great deal of ownership concentration provides enough incentives for 
major shareholders to monitor managers. 
Dempsey, S. J., Hunt, H. G., & Schroeder, N. W. (1993). Detected that different levels of ownership concentration are 
related with different levels of opportunistic earnings' management. However some researchers show that concentrated 
ownership can harm firm value, more specifically when major shareholders not only possess firm concentrated ownership 
but they also participate in managerial teams. 
Yermack (1996), studying a sample of 452firms during 1991-2003, indicates that when CEO and board chairman are two 
different individuals, the firm is of higher value. 
Beasley, M. S. (1996) found out in his research that the more non-bound members of the board increase, the less 
possibility of deception will be found in fiscal notes. 
Agrawal, A., &Knoeber, C. R. (1996).Concluded that institutional shareholders concentration can increase management 
monitoring, so that it can improve firm performance. Press enter 
Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., & Sweeney, A. P. (1996) concluded in their study that in companies having strayed from 
accounting accepted principles and exaggerated their earnings reports it's possible that interior managers would be 
dominant to the board of directors and perhaps managing directors and board chairman maybe the same person, and 
definitely there would not rather be an auditing committee and ultra-organizational major shareholders.  
Burgstahler, D., &Dichev, I. (1997) concluded that there is a higher possibility for doing earnings management in 
companies having several various shareholders comparing companies having major shareholders.  
Black, B. S. (1998) believed that firms having several various owners and without major shareholders have more 
incentives for earnings management.  
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Pope, P., Peasnell, K., & Young, S. (1998) examined the relation between management rewards and earnings 
management. Research results show that there is a negative significant relation between earnings multiplying accruals 
and ratio of outside board members. 
Bushee, B. J. (1998) believed that there's a higher possibility to perform earnings management in companies within which 
ownership is mainly belonging to institutional investors,(comparing other companies) since institutional investors' 
behaviors are temporary and changeable and they aim at short terms keeping sharers. 
Healy, P. M., &Wahlen, J. M. (1999).Bergstresser, D., &Philippon, T. (2006) pointed to some issues such as accelerating 
product sales and, correcting timing program of products' delivery, delay in expenditure on development and research and 
saving expenses, maintenance and repairing as a part of earnings manipulation process.  
Himmelberg, C. P., Hubbard, R. G., &Palia, D. (1999) didn't notice any relation between non-bound members ratio and 
performance, while others, concluded that there is a positive relation between non-bound manager's ratio and 
performance. 
Degeorge, F., Patel, J., &Zeckhauser, R. (1999)found out that earnings can be manipulated through manipulation of 
accruals management, changing economic events (real management) or a combination of both; they also concluded that 
non-bound managers and major institutional investors have a close relation with Earnings management. 
Rajgopal (1999), Yermak (1996), and Rechner and Dalton (1991) found out that the firms having a non-bound chairman in 
their board of directors, perform better than the ones under CEO's influence. If CEO's influence decreases monitoring the 
management, it will probably decrease the information content of earnings, too. In other words, there is a reverse relation 
between CEO'(chief executive officer')s influence and the information content of earnings. 
Dechow, P. M., & Skinner, D. J. (2000). Found out that firms managing directors (CEO) reduce expense for firm's 
development and fulfillment thereabout the end of their management period in order to increase accounting interest and in 
result to increase their end of service rewards.  
Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) found out that there is a negative significant relation between ownership concentration 
and earnings management. 
Peasnell (2000) indicated that there is a reverse relation between the number of non-bound directors and the possibility of 
unusual accruals management in order to avoid loss or earnings loss reporting. 
Lehmann and Jorjen (2000), using 361 German firms during 1991-1996, indicated that 1) the presence of many 
shareholders does not necessarily increase profitability, and 2) a high degree of ownership concentration seems less than 
optimal for many German firms. Their results, also, imply implicitly that ownership concentration has a negative significant 
impact on profitability.  
Black (2001) found out from a research study conducted in Russia that there is a relation between corporate governance 
and firm performance. In a similar study in the USA, Gumperz, Easti, and Metrik (2003) came to the same conclusion. 
Marrakchi (2001) studied corporate ownership and its effect on earnings management and the quality of information 
disseminated to the public. He states that non-bound members of the board and audit committee restrain largely earnings 
management activities.  
Chtourous, et al. (2001) found that there is a negative relation between the amount of board's independence and the level 
of earnings management. 
Bedard, Chtourou, and Courteau (2001) found that there is a positive relation between discretionary accruals and having 
CEO as the board chairman.  
Rajgopal, et al.  (2002), Balsam, et al. (2002) indicated that increasing institutional ownership reduces directors' incentives 
to manipulate earnings, and thus it increases the information content of earnings. However, Fun and Wanng (2002), 
studying this relation in East Asian firms, found other results and indicated that this relation is reversed in East Asia; the 
more the level of institutional ownership, the less the information content of earnings.  
Kinney (2002) concluded that ownership structure affects earnings management, and it is a strong incentive for that. The 
findings are similar to the findings of Darrough, et al.  (1998) on Japanese firms. 
Lawler, et al (2002) presented data and information which shows that board members' independence is an important 
factor in enhancing and strengthening the monitoring role of board members.  
Chung (2002) and Klein (2002), studying the relation between institutional investors and accruals management, found that 
institutional investors prevent from management engagement in managing accruals for facilitating the earnings in order to 
achieve the desired level of profitability. 
Anderson, et al. (2003) concluded that board independence is positively related to the information content of earnings. 
Rosenberg (2003) concluded from his researches that firms implementing corporate governance appropriately, enjoy 
stock returns, firm value, and cash flow ratio, compared to the firms which have an inappropriate corporate governance.  
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Koh (2003) studied the relation between institutional ownership and earnings management in Australian firms. The results 
showed that institutional ownership reduction leads to increased earnings management, and also, increasing institutional 
ownership leads to the earnings management reduction. 
Xie (2003). The results showed that there is a reverse relation between independent non-bound directors and 
discretionary accruals. 
Gul, and Leung (2004) found out from their research that there is a positive significant relation between CEO's influence 
and earnings management. 
Jae-Seung, Jun-koo, and Kyung-Suh (2004) came to the following conclusions: better directors make better corporate 
governance, and they pay attention to their stakeholders, and there is a positive relation between firm value and corporate 
governance. 
Peasnell, K. V., Pope, P. F., & Young, S. (2005) showed that a monitoring that is attributable to corporate governance 
reduces managers' contents for earnings management so it can improve useful notifying ability of accounting earnings. 
Peasnell, et al. (2005) studied earnings management in England. Considering board of directors, their study focuses on 
the role of non-bound directors and audit committee. The results showed that there is a reverse relation between the 
number of non-bound directors and the probability of unsual accruals management in order to prevent loss or earnings 
reduction reporting. 
Ramsey and Mather (2005) found a non-linear relation between the percentage of board ownership and earnings quality, 
and a positive relation between the proportion of independent directors and earnings quality. They also found that there is 
no relation between the number of board members and the level of earnings quality. 
Gunny (2005) concluded from his research study that firms that had limitations in increasing earnings through accruals, 
had decreased public, administrative, and sale expenses.  
Almazan, et al. (2005). Their findings indicate that institutional shareholders who have no commercial relation with the 
firm, have an essential role in the regulation and proper management of managerial activities. 
Saleh, Iskandar, and Rahmat (2005) indicated in their research entitled " Earnings Management and Board Characteristics 
in Malaysia" that there is a reverse relation between discretionary accruals, as an index of earnings management, and 
directors ownership, but it is a direct relation while considering the role of CEO as the board chairman. The results also 
state that multiple management factor is effective in the discovery of earnings management activities in order to hide the 
loss. 
Roychowdhury (2006) studied the impact of board's reward on the earnings management in Canadian firms. The results 
indicate that on the contrary to outside board of directors, earnings management is first decreased by non-bound board of 
directors, and then decreased more by active institutional shareholders' board. 
AbdolRahman and FiroozanaHanim (2006). The results show that earnings management is in direct relation with the 
number of board members. 
Velury and Jenkins (2006) studied the relation between stock institutional ownership and earnings quality during 1992-
1999. The results indicate that there is a positive significant relation between stock institutional ownership and earnings 
quality. Also, the findings showed that there is a negative significant relation between ownership concentration and 
earnings quality. Niu (2006) achieved the same results in Canadian firms. 
Frank Yu (2006) studied the relation between corporate governance and earnings management. He categorized corporate 
governance variables into two internal and external categories. Internal variables include ownership concentration and 
board structure, and external variables include institutional ownership. The results indicate that firms with stronger internal 
variables are more likely to manage earnings, compared to firms with stronger external variables. 
Cheng and Courtenay (2006) indicated that firms with a higher proportion of independent board members, or the ones in 
which most board members are independent ones, have higher levels of voluntary disclosure. 
Yu (2006) suggested in his researches that higher institutional shareholders lead to lower earnings management. 
Mueller and Spitz (2006). The results show that the performance of firms with a managerial ownership percentage of 
above 40% is being improved. 
Bhattacharya, and Graham (2007) studied the relation between stock institutional ownership and firm performance in 
Finland. The results imply a significant two-way feedback between firm performance and stock institutional ownership. 
Imam and Malik (2007), their research findings show that corporation ownership has a positive significant impact on 
corporation performance, and the focus of managerial ownership has a negative significant impact on dividend policy. 
Osma, et al. (2007) studied the role of board's reward and a board monitoring committee in limiting earnings management 
for Spanish firms in 1999-2001. The results indicate that earnings manipulation is significantly determined through the 
board's reward. Therefore, this limitation is conducted by institutional members of the board of directors, instead of the 
independent ones. 
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Kapopoulos, et al. (2007) studied "Corporate Ownership Structure and Firm Performance". Using the information of 175 
Greek firms, they concluded that a more concentrated ownership structure has a positive relation with higher profitability; 
and also, the lower the ownership dispersion, the higher the profitability. 
Firth, et al. (2007), using a sample of 5189 observations in 1998-2003, studied the impact of corporate ownership structure 
on the information content of Chinese firms earnings. They concluded that ownership concentration, the presence of 
foreign stockholders, individual ownership, the kind of major stockholders' ownership, monitoring committee, and board 
composition affects earnings response coefficient (CRO).  
Wallas Davidson and Bayo V. Yong (2007) evaluated managerial incentives in earnings management. Directors close to 
retirement are more likely to apply earnings maximizing strategies. Researchers concluded that the firms in which the 
senior directors are close to retirement, have higher discretionary accruals in the year before the change. Also, firms that 
have greater reward program, have higher discretionary accruals. 
Hashim and Devi (2007) studied the relation between corporate governance, ownership structure, and earnings quality of 
Malaysian firms during 1999-2005. The results indicate that there is a positive significant relation between stock 
institutional ownership and earnings quality; and, increasing institutional shareholders increases the quality of earnings, 
significantly. They also indicate that there is no relation between non-bound directors of the board and earnings quality. 
Setia- Atemja, et al. (2008) studied the impact of board size and its independence on earnings management. Their sample 
consists of family and non-family listed firms in Australian Stock Market during 2000-2004. Data- panel results indicate that 
independent board of directors are negatively related to earnings management.  
Chang (2008), using a sample of 989 American and 88 non-American firms, concluded that there is a positive significant 
relation between board composition and information content of earnings, as well as a negative significant relation between 
the duality of CEO's responsibility and the information content of earnings. 
Siregar (2008), in a similar research showed that directors of Jakarta Stock Exchange tend to use effective earnings 
management, more. As well, in the family-owned firms that don't belong to a business group, the directors are more likely 
to apply effective earnings management. In contrast, firm size, corporate governance, and institutional shareholders have 
no impact on directors' tendency to choose the type of earnings management.  
Jiang, et al. (2008) conducted a research study on the relation between corporate governance and earnings management. 
The results show that there is a significant relation between increasing corporate governance and decreasing discretionary 
accruals and increasing earnings quality; and in firms with poor corporate governance, earnings management is more 
probable. 
Yu (2008), Gunny (2010), Cohen and Zarowin (2010) concluded from their research studies that the firms more willing to 
manage earnings, manipulate actual activities more than other firms. Their findings show that the manipulation of actual 
activities might destroy firm value, in the long term.  
C. War Makerishnan and Yu (2008), SitaAmaja (2008), Ramisi and medr (2005), and Klein (2002) concluded that when 
the number of non-bound directors is increased in the board of directors, discretionary accruals are decreased, and non-
bound directors enhance earnings quality. 
Chang and Sun (2008) found that the duality of CEO's responsibility might endanger the effectiveness of board of 
directors' monitoring on financial reporting. Finally, they concluded that there is a positive significant relation between the 
duality of CEO' responsibility and earnings quality. 
Zouari, et al. (2009) studied the relation between stock institutional ownership and earnings management in American 
firms. Using neural networks test, the results show that having institutional owners in capital structure leads to the 
reduction of the amount of earnings management. 
Ali Shah, et al. (2009) studied the relation between board's reward and earnings management in 120 Pakistani firms. 
Using general effects model, the results indicate that there is a negative relation between institutional ownership and 
earnings management. 
Epps et al. (2009) categorized American firms into three groups: firms with very positive accruals, firms with very negative 
accruals, and firms with small (close to zero) accruals. Their results showed that very negative accruals happens in the 
firms that select their board of directors annually in small number, and have independent trading and rewarding 
committees. Also, there are very positive accruals in the firms that have a relatively independent board of directors and a 
relatively small size. 
Chung, Elder, and Kim (2009) studied "Corporate Governance and Liquidity" and concluded that good governance, 
financial and operational transparency leads to the increase in Stock Market liquidity, and therefore reduces information 
asymmetry between local and foreign investors. 
Ben Ali (2009) found that institutional American investors in France, reduce the agency compensation, and better and 
more beneficial disclosure demand, and thus they reduce information asymmetry.  
Chang and Sun (2009), as part of their research, studied changes made in information content of earnings as a result of 
Sarbense-Oxely Act. The results indicate that there is a positive significant relation between the percentage of non-bound 
members of the board and information content of earnings pre and post SOX. Furthermore, they found that there was no 
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significant relation between board chairman and CEO, pro the Act, while there is a positive significant relation, post the 
Act. 
Chang and Sun (2010) investigate the effect of corporate ownership structure disclosure on market's precision of 
information content and earnings management. They concluded that a stronger corporate ownership structure makes the 
market more reactive to earnings changes.  
Hung and Peng (2010) concluded from a research entitled "the impact of Corporate Governance on Earnings Quality", that 
in the presence of information asymmetry between directors and investors, corporate governance might have a major 
impact on earnings quality.  
Kouki, et al. (2011) studied the impact of corporate governance on earnings management, and concluded that having 
independent audit committees and not having the duality of CEO's responsibility, avoids management. 
Chang and Zhang (2011) studied "Corporate Governance and Institutional Ownership". Their study indicates that the 
proportion of corporate stock held by institutional investors increases the quality of governance structure.  
Nelson (2011) studied the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management and concluded that a 
bigger and more active board of directors can help preventing from earnings management; and the duality of CEO's 
responsibility increases earnings management. 
Midri (2003), studying ownership structure and its relation with active firms in Stock Exchange Market, found that Iranian 
Stock Market has a very concentrated ownership structure. In Iran, like China and Czech, a more concentrated ownership 
is associated with greater efficiency. In other words, ownership distribution has a negative impact on efficiency. 
RahnamayRudposhti and Nabavi (2003) concluded from a research entitled "the Impact of Corporate Governance 
Mechanism on Earnings Management", that the more ownership concentration and independent board of directors, the 
less earnings management; and finally, there is a positive significant relation between the duality of CEO's responsibility 
and earnings management. 
Khoshtinat, et al. (2004). Their research shows that directors tend to apply earnings management in firm's profit and loss 
periods, and also manage earnings in loss periods in order to increase their reward. 
Mazloomi (2004), studying the impact of institutional investors, indicated that when the institutional investors ownership is 
classified as major shareholders, it decreases agency compensation. He observed a positive relation between the owned 
shares of institutional investors and corporate financial performance. 
Noorvash and EbrahimiKordlar (2006). Their results showed that firms with a high percentage of corporate shareholders 
reported more information regarding upcoming earnings, compared to the firms with low percentage of corporate 
investors. As a result, more information asymmetry is observed in firms with low corporate ownership. 
Yazdanian (2007) studied the impact of some measures of corporate ownership on earnings management reduction. The 
results indicate that the only measure affecting earnings management reduction is institutional investors. While, having 
non-bound members of the board, the separation of CEO and board chairman's roles, and also having an internal auditor 
has no impact on earnings management. 
Mashayekhi (2007) studied the relation between corporate governance characteristics and earnings management. The 
findings imply that there is a significant relation between board size, the duality of CEO's responsibility, institutional 
investors' representatives in the board of directors and earnings management.  
Qanbari (2008) studied the impact of non-bound members' proportion, information transparency, an internal auditor, and 
the presence of institutional investors as the measures of corporate governance on firm performance. The results show 
that the presence of institutional investors and internal auditors affect firm performance. 
Mahavar Poor (2008) suggested that there is a significant relation between the ownership concentration and EPS 
standard; that is, the more ownership concentration, the more control on directors, which leads to the improvement of firm 
performance.  
Yazdanian, Narges (2008) concluded from her MA thesis entitled "the Impact of Corporate Governance on Earnings 
Management" that while the institutional investors' ownership in firms, is more than 45%, earnings management is 
reduced. 
Namazi and Kermani (2009) studied the effect of ownership structure on firm performance. Studying 66 firms during 2003-
2007, they suggested that there is a significant relation between institutional ownership and firm performance, and a 
positive significant relation between corporate ownership and firm performance. Managerial ownership affects firm 
performance in a negative significant way. 
Hadavi (2010) studied the relation between capital structure, ownership structure, and determining some influential 
characteristics on capital structure. The results imply a relation between capital structure and ownership structure. 
Ahmad Poor, et al. (2010). The research studies the effect of non-bound directors and institutional investors as monitoring 
devices for corporate governance on earnings management. Their study indicates that in the cases of high incentives for 
earnings manipulation, non-bound directors and major institutional investors have a poor role in reducing the abnormality 
of unusual accruals.   
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Moradzade, et al. (2010) studied the relation between earnings management and institutional ownership. In general, the 
results of this study imply a negative significant relation between the level of institutional ownership and its concentration, 
and earnings management. 
Aghai and Chalaki (2010) studied the relation between corporate governance characteristics and earnings management. 
To measure earnings quality, the research uses abnormal accruals. The results imply that there is a negative significant 
relation between institutional ownership and board independence, and earnings management. But, there is no significant 
relation between other corporate governance characteristics and earnings management. 
Ashrafi (2011) studied the relation between governance mechanisms and capital structure. The results of this study imply 
a significant relation between institutional ownership as the governance mechanism, and capital structure. 
Nasrollahi and Arefmanesh (2011) studied the relation between ownership and earnings quality. Their results show that 
having institutional investors in firm ownership structure leads to presenting honest, more relevant, and timely information; 
and the concentration of institutional investors leads to the decreased earnings quality. 
Setayesh, et al. (2011) studied the impact of corporate governance on facilitating earnings during 2004-2008. They 
concluded that board composition, institutional ownership, and managerial ownership affects earnings facilitation, while 
board independence does not affect earnings facilitation.  
Zanjirdar, Amirhosseini, and Zmanai (2011) studied the relation between corporate governance mechanisms and earnings 
management in Iranian Capital Market. The results show that there is a reverse significant relation between the presence 
of an internal auditor, the percentage of major shareholders ownership and the proportion of non-bound members of 
board. 
Izadinia and Rasaian (2011) studied the relation between some measures of corporate governance and economic 
financial standards of performance evaluation. They showed that there is a relation between corporate governance 
monitoring measures and all standards of performance evaluation. 
Vakilifard and Bavandpoor (2011) studied the relation between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. 
The results imply that there is a positive significant relation between institutional investors and firm performance. They, 
also, found that there is a reverse significant relation between non-bound board members in board composition and firm 
performance.  
Fazlzade, et al. (2011) conducted a research study aimed at determining the role of ownership structure on firm 
performance. They suggest that ownership concentration has no significant impact on firm performance, but insti tutional 
ownership has a significant impact on ownership concentration. 
Nikbakht and RahmaniNia (2011) indicate that there is a positive significant relation between institutional ownership and 
firm performance. 
Mashayekhi and Mohamamdabadi (2011), Ebrahimikordlar and Arabi (2011), Mashayekhi and Mohamadabadi (2011) 
studied the relation between corporate governance mechanisms and earnings quality. The results imply that as the board 
sessions and the number of non-bound directors in it increase, the outer-organizational ownership concentration, the 
quality (stability and prediction ability) of accounting earnings are increased. 
Ismail ZadeMafari, et al. (2011) studied the impact of corporate governance on earnings quality. The results showed that 
there is a significant relation between institutional investors' ownership, the number of blocks for major investors, the 
percentage of non-bound directors, the duality of CEO's responsibility, the amount of firm's audit and earnings quality. 
SohrabAsta (2012) studied the relation between capital structure and earnings management, he concluded that there is a 
negative significant relation between institutional ownership, managerial ownership and earnings management. But there 
is a positive significant relation between corporate ownership and earnings management. 
Vali Poor and Khoram (2012) proved that there is a negative significant relation between the percentage of institutional 
investors' ownership, the percentage of managerial stock ownership, the percentage of non-bound members of board, the 
ratio of short-term to long-term debt, and agency compensation. 
Karimi and Ashrafi (2012) studied the relation between corporate governance mechanisms and capital structure in Tehran 
Stock Exchange. The results indicate that there is a positive significant relation between institutional governance as an 
outside mechanism of corporate governance and capital structure. 
3) Research hypothesis: 
Major hypothesis: there is a relation between corporate governance and real activities manipulation (real earnings 
management). 
Minor hypothesis:  
1– There is a relation between ownership concentration and unusual manufacturing expenses.  
2– There is a relation between ownership concentration and unusual voluntaryexpenses. 
3 – There is a relation between independence of Board of Directors' members and unusual production expense. 
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4 – There is a relation between independence of board of directors' members and unusual voluntary expenses. 
4) Research method:  
Since this paper seeks to improve decision-making in firms relevant to our survey field through using available models, 
methods and theories according to research objectives, it's an applied study, inductive conclusion method was utilized to 
explained results derived by descriptive method from the randomly selected sample while results were generalized 
statistical population. Since the base of data analysis history refers to the firm's previous performance, its post – event in 
terms of research design. 
(A) Statistical population:  
The study statistical population consists of96 stock firms having the same fiscal year, being active during studied period, 
without financial intermediary or enterprise, that wereselected randomly. These companies performance was examined 
during a six-year periodfrom 2006 up to 2012. 
(B) Analysis methods: 
The below statistical methods were used for analyzing and describing data: 
1)Descriptive methods: on the way of describing statistical sample and research findings we used mean parameters 
to amputation, variance, standard deviation and ranking tables and pictorial graphs. 
2) The default analysis methods: because of using multivariate linear regression, defaults of this method were 
examined. So to examine normalization of independent and dependent variables distribution, Kolmogorov – Smirnov test 
was used and F lamer test was used for selection between pooled data and panel data.Hussmann test statistic was used 
for determining sectional units fixed or random differences, White test for variances heterogeneity. To examine 
independent errors or medical relation between independent variable Durbin Watson test wasused for. 
3) Analyzing the relations between variables: multivariate linear regression was used for analyzing the relation 
between variables. T statistic and F statistic were used for generalizing parameters to the studied population and also to 
determine model and direction of relation. 
C) Research model: 
In this study the model of main relation between earnings management and other variables is as follows: 
Y =F (X1, X 2), in this equation Y stands for and earnings. Management index, X1: ownership concentration, X2: board 
members' independence. Two criteria were used for earnings real management in accordance with ZarowinandCohen 
(2010). Unusualvoluntaryexpense was estimated via equation (1) and the relation remainder must be considered as the 
unusual voluntary expenses (ABEXP). 
(1) DISEXPit/TAit-1=α0(1/TAit-1)+α1(Salesit/TAit-1)+ λit 
DISEXPit: is the voluntary expense of i company at the end of t fiscal year that equals official and sales expense. 
ΔSalesit; sales changes of i company at the end of t-1 year and TAit-1 stands for total assets of the last year. Furthermore, 
abnormal production expenses were estimated via relation (2), in such a way that the relation remainder is considered as 
the criterion of abnormal production expenses (ABEXPENSE). 
PRODit/TAit-1=α0 (1/TAit-1) +α1 (Salesit/TAit-1) +α2 (ΔSalesit /TAit-1) +α3 (ΔSalesit-1/TAit-1) +δit 
PRODit is the production expenseof i company at the end of t year that equals final expense of sold goods + changes of 
inventory. 
5) Research findings: 
This section dealt with describing and analyzing the mentioned findings. First we describe the variables making use of the 
statistical indices, then we examined the defaults used in multivariate linear regression and at last the relations between 
variables were analyzed. 
A) The findings description 
Findings were described based on operational data and are summarized in table1. 
Table 1: findings description 
Variable Symbol Mean Median Minimum Maximum St. deviation 
Earnings real management 
based on production expenses 
EMA1 -5/95 -0/009 -0/11 0/25 0/04 
earnings real management 
based on voluntary expenses 
EMA2 3/12 0/015 -0/56 0/68 0/14 
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Ownership concentration OC 0/76 0/81 0/09 0/99 0/2 
Board of directors' 
independence 
IB 0/58 0/6 0 1 0/25 
Firm size SIZE 13/1 12/9 9/78 17/89 1/22 
Profitability ROA 0/12 0/1 -0/33 0/64 0/12 
financial leverage Lev 0/65 0/66 0/07 0/9 0/17 
 
Ownership concentration mean equals 76% in the studied companies the region the mentioned period. Ownership 
concentration median was also 81%. Ownership concentration minimum and maximumwere respectively 9% and 99%. 
This variable standard deviation alsois 20%. Board of Directors' independence was 58%. In other words 58% of board 
positions of the related companies belonged to board non-bound members. Mean and median symmetry of the variables 
and their standard deviation imply that the information is almost normal. 
B) Defaults analysis: multivariate linear regression was used to determine the relations between dependent and 
independent variables, having some defaults, including variables distribution normality and . . . that had been examined. 
1) Evaluating variables distribution normality: this evaluation is based on Kolmogorov – Smirnov test and primary 
results show that the significance level was lower than 1 and 5%, and normalization of variables distribution is being 
rejected in 95% confidence. To remove this problem transformation of squares logarithm was used and again distribution 
normalization test was repeated. In case of transformational variables, results confirmed the normality of variables 
distribution. 
2) Linear independence of independent variables: an outer default was to use multivariate linear regression, 
proving additiveassumption or independent variables linear independence from each other. Pearson correlation analysis 
was performed in order to evaluate this default. Table 2 shows the summary of results. 
Table 2: evaluating linear independence of independent variables 
 EM1 EM2 SIZE LEV ROA OC IB 
EM1 1.000000 -0.152072 -0.086336 0.030207 -0.098688 -0.117769 -0.072854 
EM2 -0.152072 1.000000 0.054115 0.221129 -0.499211 -0.002170 -0.166944 
SIZE -0.086336 0.054115 1.000000 -0.074537 0.117975 0.131448 -0.088965 
LEV 0.030207 0.221129 -0.074537 1.000000 -0.464195 0.111905 -0.131482 
ROA -0.098688 -0.499211 0.117975 -0.464195 1.000000 0.031892 0.160530 
OC -0.117769 -0.002170 0.131448 0.111905 0.031892 1.000000 -0.066360 
IB -0.072854 -0.166944 -0.088965 -0.131482 0.160530 -0.066360 1.000000 
 
According to table 2 results, since correlation coefficients between independent variables tends toward zero so the 
assumption of variables linear independence can be accepted. 
3) Variances homogeneity: White test was used and results showed that since significance level is higher than 5% for 
both estimated relations sozero assumption was accepted on the basis of variance of similarity(homology) and a squares 
minimum method can be applied to estimate the relation between variables. Test results are shown in table 3. 
Table 3: White test results with 95% confidence level 
The 
relation 
F statistic Significance level Test results 
No 1 0.641 0.7163 Variances are homogeneous 
No 2 0.63 0.7326 Variances are homogeneous 
 
4) Evaluating selection method to analyze panel data: F Lamer test andHussmanntest were used. Both tests 
results indicated a significance level higher than 5% so collating method was used on the basis of fixed effects. 
C) Analyzing the relation between variables: 
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Regarding the proven defaults as explained before, here a multivariate linear regression is used for determining the 
relation between variables. 
1) Earnings management on the basis of abnormal voluntary expenses: in this evaluation, earnings 
management was performed based on the first defined equation in the conducted research and abnormal voluntary 
expenses were computed as the model remainder then its relation with corporate governance determinants was 
estimated. The summary of these results is available in table 4. The research Main independent variables are corporate 
governance elements including (IB or OC) ownership concentration and board independence Along with other variables of 
firm size, financial leverage and efficiency up shareholders' salary. The below analysis would be derived by this table 
figures:  
The first: the coefficient of ownership concentration independence variable as the first element, corporate governance 
equals 0.006 and and positive so there is a direct relation between corporate governance and earnings management 
based on voluntaryexpenses. Its significance level is greater than 5% in the last column; this relation can be considered 
significant in statistical population. 
The second: independent variable coefficient of the board independence as the second component of corporate 
governance equals-0.007 since it is negative so there's a reverse relation between corporate governance and earnings 
management based on voluntary expenses. Their significance level tending to zero is lower than 5%in the last column, so 
this relation can be considered significant in statistical population. 
The thirst: coefficients of other size variables, financial leverage and shareholders salary efficiency were respectively -
0.008, -0.0 14,-0.04, and since it is negative so there's a reverse relation between earnings management and variables of 
firm size, financial leverage and shareholders salary efficiency. The significance level is higher than 5% in the last column 
and it can't be considered significantin statistical population. 
Durbin Watson statistic was 1.36 in this table and it's between 1.5 up to 2.5; and the independent errors of estimated 
relation can be accepted. Furthermore, coefficient of estimated relation, tending to zero it equals 0.19 indicating that 
there's a weak linear relation between corporate governance elements and earnings management based on unusual 
voluntary expenses.  
Table4: results derived from model process 
variable coefficient Standard deviation T statistic Significance level 
Constant 0/119 0/015 7/869 0/000 
OC 0/006 0/006 1/003 0/3160 
IB -0/007 0/0019 -3/89 0/0001 
Size -0/008 0/0009 -8/112 0/000 
Lev -0/014 0/003 -4/578 0/000 
ROA -0/04 0/0047 -8/745 0/000 
Determination 
coefficient 
0/19 Adjusted coefficient of determination 0/052 
F statistic 1/36 Durbin Watson 1/17 
F possibility (0/0015) Significance level 16/36 
REM1it =  + β1OC it + β2IBit + β3Sizeit + β4Levit + β5ROAit + ε 
2) Earnings management on the basis of production abnormal expenses: in this survey, an earnings management was 
performed based on second equation defined in research model andabnormal productionexpenses were calculated as the 
model remainder then its relation to corporate governance elements was estimated. Results summary is shown in table 4. 
Research Main independent variables are corporate governance elements including (IB and OC) ownership concentration 
and board of directors' independence outlines the other variables of company size, financial leverage and shareholders 
salary efficiency. We can analyze as follow based on this table contents: 
The first: coefficient of ownership concentration independent variable as the first element of corporate governance 
equals -0.12, since it is negative so there is a reverse relation between corporate governance and earnings management 
on the basis of production expenses. Its significance level well under the last column equals 5%. 
Durbin Watson statistic was between 1.5 of 22.5 in table 6.1 and errors independence of the estimated relation can be 
accepted. Furthermore estimated relation coefficient of determination equals 0.49 being close to 0.5 Beth reveals a linear 
relation between corporate governance elements and earnings management on the basis of unusual production expense 
in the average extent. 
Table 5: results obtained from model process 
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variable coefficient Standard 
deviation 
T statistic Significance level 
Constant -0/03 0/034 -0/85 0/3915 
OC -0/012 0/015 -0/82 0/4098 
IB -0/044 0/012 -3/68 0/0002 
Size 0/012 0/002 4/92 0/000 
Lev -0/021 0/021 -1/01 0/3125 
ROA -0/65 0/031 -21/21 0/000 
Determination 
coefficient 
0/49  
Adjusted coefficient of determination 
0/48 
F statistic 127 Durbin Watson 1/6 
F possibility (0/000) 
chaw's significance 
test 
3/1 
(0/000) 
Hussman test of Significance level 58/5 
(0/000) 
REM2it =  + β1OC it + β2IBit + β3Sizeit + β4Levit + β5ROAit + ε 
6) Conclusion: 
According to the empirical bases it was expected that there will be a relation between corporate governance elements 
including board independence, ownership concentration and earnings real management. So a statistical sample was 
selected by simple random sampling method consisting of 96 companies amongst accepted companies in Tehran stock 
exchange. The studied time span was from 2006 up to 2012. Regarding the applied trend in some similar researches, we 
made use of multivariate linear regression with analyzing combined data to determine the relation between variables. 
While the relevant defaults to the use of this method was examined beforehand. Examinations results showed that: 
1. There's a significant and reverse relation between corporate governance and earnings real management on the basis of 
board independence. In other words, companies with a higher percentage of board non-bound members would have less 
incentives for earnings real management. 
2. According to research findings there seems not to be any significant relation between ownership concentration and 
earnings real management on the basis of unusual production expenses. 
3. Regarding research findings there seems not to be any significant relation between ownership concentration and 
earnings real management on the basis of unusual voluntary expenses. 
4. Regarding research findings there is a reverse and significant relation between board independence and earnings real 
management on the basis of production unusual expenses. 
5. Regarding research findings there is a negative and significant relation between board independence and real earnings 
management on the basis of unusual voluntary expenses. 
6. There seems to be a reverse and significant relation between profitability, financial leverage and company size and real 
earnings management on the basis of unusual production expenses. 
7. There was a significant and reverse relation between profitability and real earnings management but a direct and 
significant relation between company size and real earnings management on the basis of voluntary production expenses. 
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